The Affordable Care Act includes four significant, permanent, implicit unemployment assistance programs, plus various implicit subsidies for underemployment. Every sector of the economy, and about half of nonelderly adults, is directly affected by at least one of those provisions. This paper calculates the ACA's impact on the average reward to working among nonelderly household heads and spouses. The law increases marginal tax rates by an average of five percentage points (of employee compensation), on top of the marginal tax rates that were already present before the it went into effect. The ACA's addition to labor tax wedges is roughly equivalent to doubling both employer and employee payroll tax rates for half of the population.
and changing weekly hours -has its own "statutory" incentive index time series {b t }.
The three margin-specific series are combined into an overall statutory work incentive index by taking a fixed-weighted average of the three.
Each of the three incentive indices is a sum of program-specific terms, such as a food stamp term, a payroll tax term, etc. 
where t indexes time and j indexes safety net programs. Each program's term is itself the product of a statutory eligibility index {E jt } and a statutory benefit-per-participant index {B jt }. The two indices, and therefore their product, change only at dates t when new program rules ("statutes") go into effect. The program-specific products {E jt B jt } are combined into the statutory incentive index by aggregating them with a set of timeinvariant program weights  j , which reflect time-invariant estimates of the propensity of people to participate in program j while they are not employed or otherwise with reduced labor supply.
The Affordable Care Act can itself be understood as a collection of programs, each of which has its own term in the sums that form the three work incentive indices.
Those programs are: employer shared responsibility penalties, individual mandate relief, health insurance subsidies for persons who are not offered affordable employersponsored insurance (hereafter, ESI) even when employed, and health insurance subsidies for persons who are offered affordable ESI when and only when they are employed.
The ACA provisions interact with related public policies, especially unemployment insurance and uncompensated care. In order to include these interaction terms in my index for the overall safety net, I therefore add two terms quantifying those interactions: "implicit taxation of unemployment benefits" and "move off implicit compensated care tax."
All six of these programs are listed in 
ACA Penalty Components of the Marginal Tax Rate Index
The ACA includes monetary penalties on employers who do not offer health insurance to their full-time employees and on individuals who fail to participate in the 2 As of the time of writing, the latest available annual price index was for 2012; for the purposes of calculating 2014 dollars, I assume average annual inflation of 2 percent between 2012 and 2014. The 2014 median working household head and spouse will probably earn slightly more than $790 per week because, among other things, lower skill workers exited the workforce between 2007 and 2014. 3 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the same methodology could be used to examine other points in the wage distribution as in Mulligan (2013a) .
5 health plans that are made available to them. These penalties are known as the employer and individual shared responsibility provisions, respectively. The individual penalty has also been described as the "individual mandate."
Through its employer shared responsibility provision, the ACA penalizes assessable employers: any large employer that does not offer comprehensive health insurance to its full time employees. The amount of the penalty is based on the number of full time employees (beyond 30) on the employer's monthly payroll during the calendar year in which it is assessable. A large employer is one with at least fifty fulltime equivalent employees in the prior calendar year.
With a few exceptions related to thresholds and timing, each full-time employee's presence on an assessable employer's payroll creates a marginal cost of employment in the form of the employer shared responsibility penalty: the employer would owe less penalty if the employee were working part time instead, or were absent from the payroll altogether. Because the employer shared responsibility penalty is contingent on a person's work status, it has many of the economic characteristics of unemployment benefits and payroll taxes -at least for the purposes of quantifying incentives to work.
Taking into account interactions between the penalties and corporate, personal, and payroll taxes, the monthly amount of the penalty is $192 per month in 2015 and increases with the growth rate of health care costs thereafter, 4 which I assume to be 1.6 percent per year in excess of wage growth. Thus, for the purposes of constructing work incentive indices for unemployment and out of the labor force, the shared responsibility index is zero for all months prior to January 2015, $192 for each month of 2015, $195 for each month of 2016, etc. The benefit index is expressed in 2014 dollars and shown in the top row of Table 1 's top panel. 4 The $192 monthly amount is $2,000 per year times the growth rate factor of 1.016 times (1-0.0765-0.18) for employee payroll and income taxes divided by 1.0765*(1-0.39) for employer taxes. Section 1302 of the ACA provides for a premium adjustment percentage based on the growth of the average per capita premium for health insurance coverage in the United States. The ACA specifies a $2,000 penalty for 2014 as well, but the U.S. Treasury will not be enforcing employer penalties for calendar year 2014.
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The share responsibility penalty can be avoided for employees if their hours are reduced below 30. 5 For the purpose of constructing the statutory index for weekly hours, the benefit index can be either greater or less than it is for unemployment. On one hand, the hourly penalty is about twice as large for hours changes that cross the part-time threshold than for changing employment status. 6 On the other hand, not all hours changes cross the part-time threshold and therefore would not change penalty status. The former effect dominates, so that the hourly penalty is fifteen percent greater when labor supply is adjusted on the weekly hours margin rather than weeks employed. Individuals who have access to affordable health insurance (either through their employer or through the marketplaces created by the ACA) but fail to participate are liable for the individual mandate penalty, unless they are experiencing hardship. The hardship exemption acts as an implicit tax on work to the extent that not working allows a person to be classified as experiencing hardship. The text of the ACA is unclear as to the relation between employment and hardship for the purposes of granting the exemption. I assume that, conditional on not having insurance, the penalty is paid only when working or out of the labor force because unemployed persons will be eligible for a hardship exemption.
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When applicable, the amount of the individual mandate penalty is the maximum of a flat amount per uninsured household member and a percentage of household income, both of which vary among the years 2014, 2015, and 2016 (U.S. Internal Revenue 5 The ACA's threshold for part-time work is 30 hours per week for hourly employees. For salaried employees, the threshold is three days per week. 6 Full-time employed (as measured by the Bureau of Labor statistics: employees working 35 hours per week or more; this part of the calculation is intended to represent labor market conventions rather than statutory definitions of full-time work) household heads and spouses work an average of 43.5 hours per week. Part-time employed heads and spouses average work hours are 21.4: the scaling factor is 43.5/(42.5-21.4). Note that the first weekly hour worked over 30 creates a penalty equivalent to about $60 of weekly wages. Working 43.5 hours rather than 30 therefore costs more than $4 per hour (plus payroll and personal income taxes on the additional wages), which is a significant cost for someone with wages of about $17 per hour. 7 During the 2008-9 recession, 58 percent of per capita hours reductions by full-time workers involved crossing the part-time threshold (as defined by the BLS: see below for the data source) as opposed to reductions in average hours among the full-time employed. I therefore rescale the benefit index on the employment margins by a factor of 0.58*43.5/(43.5-21.4) = 1.15 in order to obtain a benefit index on the weekly hours margin. 8 Assuming that out-of-the labor force status counts as hardship would add less than one dollar to my bottom line $208 total work disincentive of the ACA.
7 Service 2013a). Because my indices are built for the median earner I use the percentages:
1 percent for 2014, 2 percent for 2015, and 2.5 percent thereafter.
The benefit index (unemployment and out of the labor force) for the individual mandate relief program is therefore equal to the penalty percentage applicable in the year times the average monthly household income among uninsured household heads and spouses with weekly earnings within 10 percent of the median. Those amounts are $51 in 2014, $103 in 2015, and $128 in 2016. For the reduced hours index the benefit index is zero because I assume that reduced hours will not be considered hardship for the purposes of relief from the mandate. These amounts derive from relief from the penalty, not the penalty itself. 9 For the reduced hours index the benefit index is zero because I assume that reduced hours will not be considered hardship for the purposes of relief from the mandate.
Jumping onto and Sliding Along the Income Scale: The ACA's
Subsidy Components of the Marginal Tax Rate Index
The ACA requires that each state (or the federal government on behalf of the state residents) set up health insurance marketplaces or "exchanges" where individuals can purchase health insurance that conforms to the law. The plans on the exchanges will be subsidized from revenues obtained from taxes on employer-sponsored plans. More important, individuals participating in exchange plans may be eligible for significant assistance (at taxpayer expense) with their premium payments and with their out-ofpocket health expenses on the basis of their household income and the fringe benefits available on their job, if any. The income and fringe benefit contingencies create a variety of implicit taxes on work. Figure 1 's payment. The schedule for premium payments can be calculated from the ACA without any assumptions about family composition or the prices that will be quoted by insurance providers on the exchanges as long as the schedule specifies a payment less than the full premium, but the out-of-pocket payments depend on the actuarial value (AV) of the policy purchased. The ACA's income-based healthcare payment schedules, such as the two shown in Figure 1 , create several types of work disincentives. First, a household head or spouse is denied access to the payment schedule as long as he or she holds a job that offers health insurance, and (if in a family between 100 and 400 percent FPL) granted access when not employed. Second, a household head or spouse can be granted access as a consequence of moving from full-time employment to part-time employment if that move results in a loss of opportunity for ESI. Third, working fewer weeks per year or hours per week enhances the exchange subsidies for persons (a) in a household between 100 and 400 percent FPL, (b) who work in a job not offering health insurance, and (c) who purchase insurance on the exchanges. Each person has a point on a schedule like the two solid schedules shown in Figure 1 and that point is determined by the amount of his household income when he works, say, 13 fewer weeks of the calendar year. The vertical distance between that point and the full expected medical payment (i.e., premiums plus expected out-of-pocket expenses) associated with the policy is the amount of the ACA's implicit subsidy for not working those 13 weeks. 13 The $508 cited above is the average vertical distance among full-time median earners in the March 2011 Current Population Survey with employersponsored health insurance, and in families between 100 and 400 percent of the FPL. For this reason, one could describe this work disincentive as persons "jumping onto" the income scale for health expenses as a consequence of not working.
Jumping onto the Income Scale for Health Payments
Full-time ESI employees can also become eligible for exchange subsidies by moving to part time, and part-time (and ESI-ineligible) employees at ESI firms will find that they lose their exchange subsidy by moving to full time. The reduced hours benefit index for this program is $582, which is the $508 scaled by the same factor as used for 11 Appendix III has more details on valuing health insurance plans. 12 The Congressional Budget Office (2013) also projects that the average exchange subsidy will be about $500 per month. the employer penalty (see above). This incentive to cut hours from full time to part time is another example of jumping onto the income scale as a consequence of working less.
At first glance, it might appear that Table 1 needs a row to indicate that people leaving ESI jobs lose the implicit subsidy for ESI associated with the exclusion of ESI premiums from income for the purposes of payroll, personal income, and business income taxation. However, Table 1 quantifies the impact of the ACA, and the loss of the implicit ESI subsidy occurred before the ACA and will continue to occur after it.
Sliding Along the Income Scale for Health Payments
The third disincentive associated with the income scales like the two shown in weighting by the width of the income interval over which they apply. Geometrically, the weighted average slope is equal to the slope of the dashed secants shown in Figure 1 . I used the weighted average slopes only for the disincentives associated with sliding along the income scale and not those associated with jumping onto the income scale. 
ACA Subsidies Interact with Other Safety Net Programs
A multitude of social safety net programs predated the ACA and served to reduce work incentives. The ACA replaces or substitutes for some of them, and thereby might reduce work incentives less than the ACA provisions would if they were introduced by themselves into a world with no safety net.
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a major safety net program, and the benefits paid by the UI program are implicitly taxed by the ACA because UI benefits are part of the household income that determines a household's assistance with health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket costs. In particular, persons laid off from a non-ESI job before the ACA would find their UI benefits taxed at normal marginal personal income tax rates but under the ACA those marginal rates jump about 24 percentage points for recipients of exchange subsidies thanks to the ACA's "sliding scale" premium assistance.
For someone receiving $1,265 per month in UI benefits -about the average among UIeligible persons with earnings potential near the median -that's an extra $301 per month in taxes.
The uninsured sometimes receive uncompensated care from health providers, and uncompensated care is likely means-tested. To the extent that the ACA reduces reliance on uncompensated care (Goolsbee 2011, oral even when they are working full-time. The ACA adds health insurance subsidies for families with incomes above the Medicaid threshold. This has no effect on the latter group because they are on Medicaid regardless of their work decision or presence of the ACA. But the former group has more resources when working as a consequence of the ACA. That by itself reduces marginal tax rates.
For small adjustments to annual hours worked, such as increasing unemployment time by one month, the former group is a small fraction of the labor force. The fraction would be larger for larger work hours adjustments, but perhaps still small for persons with median earning potential.
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The ACA's Medicaid expansion also eliminates Medicaid asset tests on adult participation. 17 This aspect of the expansion by itself reduces the reward to work because it introduces non-employment assistance for persons who would not pass the former asset test when during spells of non-employment. By itself, neglecting this policy change underestimates the ACA's positive impact on marginal tax rates.
15 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2008, 1). 16 By itself, approximating the size of the former group as zero overestimates the ACA's positive impact on marginal tax rates. However, I also assume that persons in families above but near 400 percent FPL do not have their marginal tax rates elevated by the exchange subsidies, but their rates are elevated to the extent that larger work hours adjustments need to be considered because a large work hours reduction would push family income below 400 percent FPL. 17 CHIP (pregnant women) assets tests had already been eliminated in 47 (43) Only the full-time position includes affordable health insurance, which means that a full-time employee would not be eligible to receive assistance from the ACA for premiums or for out-of-pocket health expenses. The employer pays 78% of the premiums for the family insurance plan, and withholds the remaining premiums of $3,146 from the paychecks of participating full-time employees. Each full-time employee's income subject to tax is $35,021, which excludes employer payroll taxes (7.65% of the $35,021), employer health insurance contributions, and employee premiums withheld.
Part-time employees get less total compensation -$37,700 -because they work fewer hours. The part-time employees are not eligible for ESI and the tax exclusions that go with it, which makes their income subject to tax ($35,021) equal to their total compensation minus employer payroll taxes. It is a coincidence that income subject to tax is the same for full-time and part-time employees: more on this below.
The part-time employees are eligible for subsidized health plans from the ACA's exchanges because they are not offered affordable health insurance by their employer. I assume that the second cheapest silver plan has the same expected medical payments as the employer plan: namely, $17,300 per year including out-of-pocket health expenses.
By definition of silver plan, the full premium is $12,110. However, because the employee has a family income subject to tax of 145% of the federal poverty line (the employee is the sole earner in a family of four), the ACA caps premiums for the second 14 cheapest silver plan at 3.7 percent of their income subject to tax, or $1,304 per year. The other $10,806 is paid by the U.S. Treasury to the insurer pursuant to the ACA.
By design, the silver health plans have lower premiums and greater out-of-pocket costs (deductibles, copayments, etc.) than the typical employer plan. That design feature is visible in my Table 2 because exchange plan out-of-pocket costs total $5,190 rather than the $3,000 of out-of-pocket health expenses associated with ESI. However, because the employee's family is at 145% of the poverty line, the employee gets an 80% discount on the out-of-pocket expenses, with the remainder paid by the U.S. Treasury to the insurer pursuant to the ACA.
After health and work expenses, the part-time employee makes $28,929 per year, which exceeds the full-time income ($27,021) after health and work expenses! Table 2 does not show the employee payroll and personal income taxes, but those would be the same for the full-time and part-time employee because the amount of the income subject to the two taxes is, in this example, independent of full-time status. Table 2 's example is special, and a bit simplified, in that part-time employees have: more disposable income than full-time employees, the same income subject to tax, and the same hourly employer cost. But the Table contains a general lesson: moving from full-time employment to part-time employment can trigger generous assistance with health premiums and out-of-pocket expenses that can offset much of the income lost due to reduced work hours. That's why Table 1 includes a significant entry for the "HI subsidies for persons w/ ESI at work" program benefit amount in the reduced hours column. Moreover, Table 2 's key parameters -$26 per hour employer cost, $14,300 premiums for ESI, and a single-earner family of four -are not extraordinary, which is a symptom of the fact that, under the ACA, it will not be extraordinary for people to be able to have more disposable income from a part-time position than from a full-time one. For example, giving a subsidy to employees who are not offered health insurance will cause more people to take jobs without health insurance. To form a weight for such a program, I follow index number theory and take the simple average of (i) the fraction of the population that would be eligible and participate with behavior held fixed at its no-ACA values, and (ii) the fraction of the population actually participating under the ACA.
Program Participation Weights
Given that I am writing before the ACA goes into full effect, I make conservative estimates of ACA behavioral patterns (i.e., for purpose of forming weights I error on the side of assuming that the ACA's behavioral effects are minor), drawing on the literature whenever possible. I also report sensitivity analysis in Appendix V. Table 3 's four panels has three entries: one for each labor supply margin. The sum of all of the weights for "FT-not employed" plus the sum of all of the weights for "PT-not employed" is one because the entire would-be working population has the option of reducing their labor supply by not working. Each "FT-PT" weight is identical to the corresponding "FT-not employed" weight because a full-time employee can reduce labor supply either by reducing hours or by not being employed.
For example, the entry of 0.183 in the top row of Table 3 means that 18.3 percent of the would-be working population of non-elderly household heads and spouses (hereafter, "population") (i) would be employed with ESI from his or her employer (who does not offer health benefits to its part-time employees) (ii) lives in a household with income between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line, and (iii) would take up an exchange subsidy if it were available. 18 The (slim) majority of the population is represented in the "all others" panel because they are insured through an employer and have household income above 400 percent FPL or because their household income is below the poverty line.
Most of Table 3 Take, for example, the 0.039 and 0.183 entries in Table 3 (2010) predicts that 3.9 million household heads and spouses will be penalized for lack of insurance among family members; my program weight is consistent with about that many penalty payers. 21 By constraining Table 3 's employment-related entries to sum to one, my estimates do not yet recognize the fact that some ESI workers will both be jumping onto the scale (the red color codes in Table 3 ) when leaving their job and sliding along it (the green color codes) due to another family member's participation in an exchange plan. This tends to understate the program weights for "HI subsidies for persons w/o ESI at work" and thereby understate the impact of the ACA on marginal labor income tax rates.
marginal tax rates, it is less common than: the employer penalties, the withholding of exchange subsidies from persons working in ESI jobs, and perhaps even less common than the hardship relief attached to the individual mandate penalty.
The eligibility-conditional take-up rate for the exchange subsidies among persons leaving employer plans is an important determinant of the entries shown in Table 3 Because I intend to estimate marginal tax rates for market-level analysis, I treat the employer penalty as $2,000 for any full-time employee hired by any firm not offering ESI to its full-time employees, implicitly ignoring the facts that (i) employers with less than 49 full-time equivalent employees will pay zero penalty at the margin and (ii) employers with exactly 49 employees will pay approximately $40,000 for an additional full-time employee. As a result, Table 1 's weight for the employer penalty is 0.23, which is the sum of one entry from the last column of each of Table 3 's four panels.
22 The lottery population is poorer, less educated, etc., than the population represented in my Table 3 's top panel, and for this reason the former group might be less likely to accept health insurance assistance than the latter group would be. Medicaid may also be more stigmatized and less well advertised than the exchange subsidies will be. On the other hand, the ACA's exchange subsidies require participants to spend some of their own money, whereas Medicaid participants pay little (if anything) to participate. My estimates assume that roughly half of workers with earnings potential near the median are not directly affected by any of the ACA provisions noted above. Less than 10 percent of such workers will be uninsured while working and therefore liable for the individual mandate penalty while working. Less than 15 percent will have non-group insurance while working and some of those will not be eligible for subsidies because their household income will be outside the 100-400 percent FPL interval. About 54 percent of median earners will have ESI at work, but more than half of them will not take up the subsidy while not working or will be ineligible for exchange subsidies when not working because their household income will be outside the subsidized interval. The remainder of workers with near median earnings potential will be covered by someone else's plan (e.g., spouse or parents), Medicare, or Medicaid.
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23 The Congressional Budget Office (2007) uses a variety of sources, including the MEPS and the Census Bureau data. Therefore my weight on MEPS is a bit larger than CBO's, but still much less than 50 percent. Cutler and Sood (2010) only consider the MEPS, and thereby conclude that only 2 million employees work in large firms not offering health insurance, as compared to the CBO's estimate of more than 15 million. This reason alone makes my estimate of the participation weight for the employer penalty program 6 or 7 times greater than it would be under Cutler and Sood's (2010) approach. In addition, Cutler and Sood appear to ignore the extraordinary penalty levied on the 50 th employee hired, and did not anticipate that the ACA's employer penalty would not be deductible from employer taxes. 24 Another way to calculate the fraction with work incentives directly affected is to add (i) the fraction of workers with ESI and in a family with income in the 1-4 FPL range (adjusted for imperfect take-up, this is the fraction who would obtain an exchange subsidy as a consequence of leaving their job), (ii) the fraction of workers at firms not offering ESI even to full-time employees (they are affected because their employer pays a penalty, or faces a large marginal cost of expanding beyond 49 employees), (iii) the non-poor uninsured aged 26-64 who work at employers offering ESI to full-time employers (if they remain uninsured, they will be subject to the individual mandate penalty and its relief provisions). The three groups cited above do not overlap. Fraction (i) is roughly 0.25 or 0.30. Fraction (ii) is roughly 0.20 or 0.25, which means that the sum (i)-(iii) is close to or exceeding 0.5.
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The weight for the ACA's implicit taxation of UI benefits is 0.05, which is the program weight for "HI subsidies for persons w/o ESI at work" times the fraction of the workforce who would, during times of unemployment, be UI eligible. 25 The program weight for the uncompensated care interaction term is the product of the propensity to be uninsured times the fraction (0.5) of those who obtain private HI coverage as a consequence of the ACA.
26

Results for the Overall Index
The bottom panel of Table 1 accumulates the results of the top and middle panels. On average, the ACA adds $208 per month to the assistance, if any, they get when they move from full-time work to part-time work. In order to be comparable with the results for the other margins, the $208 has already been scaled (see also above) so that the change in labor supply on each of the three margins reflects the same impact on aggregate hours. 27 The $208 is historically unusual because a number of pre-ACA safety net programs are designed to help primarily people without jobs whereas few (if any) are 25 In order to calculate the benefit index for the "HI subsidies for persons w/ ESI at work," I took the household incomes of workers as they were in 2010, without any reduction for the income that would be lost by working less and thereby somewhat underestimating the amount of the subsidy (recall that subsidies are enhanced by reducing household income). That excluded lost household income would be net of UI benefits, which is why, for consistency, my Table 1 must also exclude an UI offset for "HI subsidies for persons w/ ESI at work." 26 Instead of applying the removal of the uncompensated care tax to a portion of the uninsured, it could be applied to a somewhat broader group, thereby treating the uncompensated care component of my marginal tax rate formula as a catchall for the propensity of the ACA to replace "free care," such as Medicaid, with insurer-financed care. 27 E.g., reducing weekly hours by 20 (roughly half of full time) would be the same as reducing the probability of employment during a week by one half. Another example: a new flat-rate payroll tax would add the same dollar amount to the benefit index regardless of whether the labor margin was unemployment, OLF, or reduced hours.
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designed to primarily help people with jobs at reduced hours. 28 The employer shared responsibility penalty can be avoided either by non-employment or reduced hours, but the penalty is also unusual -and different from a flat-rate payroll tax -in that it can be avoided with a lesser percentage reduction in hours than in employment.
The final two rows of Table 1 Taking into account both the benefit amounts and the participation weights, the three largest components of the $208 per month disincentive are, in order: (a) the 28 See also Mulligan (2012) . 29 The data used to measure the three labor supply weights can also be used to quantify the relative contributions to aggregate work hours changes of hours reductions by full-time employees that changed their status to part-time and hours reductions that did not change their status; this is the source of the 0.58 scaling factor used above to calculate benefit indices for the reduced hours margin. 30 The $208 per month result is not sensitive to the labor supply margin weights because the margin specific totals have a pretty tight range: $207 to $211. The $208 also excludes the ACA's Additional Medicare Tax of 0.9 percent of earnings above a threshold (approximately $200,000 per year), beginning in 2013, because a median earner does not earn enough to be subject to this tax (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 2013b). Among all non-elderly heads and spouses, about one percent will pay the tax in 2014, which makes its contribution to average marginal tax rates about 0.01 percentage points: at least two orders of magnitude less than the rest of the ACA.
22 premium assistance that becomes available when a person transitions from ESI employment to non-employment (and is withheld when transitioning back), (b) the premium assistance that is enhanced when a worker with premium assistance works a lesser fraction of the year, and (c) the premium assistance that becomes available when a person transitions from ESI employment to part-time employment. To put it another way, even if we completely ignored the sliding scale nature of the premium assistance (item (b)), the ACA's added disincentive would still be more than $147 per month. By 2016, the index exceeds 50%, which is at least 10 percentage points greater than it was in early 2007. Over that time frame, the marginal after-tax share falls from 60 percent to 50 percent, which means that at a given marginal productivity of labor the reward to working fell 17 percent.
Conclusions
The Among the near-median heads and spouses with marginal tax rate hikes, the hike as of 2015 will average about 10 percentage points of total compensation, on top of all of the marginal tax rates that were present before the ACA. Their new tax wedge will, on average, be similar to doubling their employer and employee payroll taxes. As Table 2 illustrates, some middle-class workers will find that they can work substantially less without losing any disposable income. The average marginal tax rate hike among all sometime-employed non-elderly near-median household heads and spouses -including in the average those with no hike -is five percentage points.
Five percentage points is large by historical standards. While it lasted, the payroll tax cut of 2011 was one third of the magnitude of the ACA's tax rate hike. 31 Several SNAP (formerly food stamp program) expansions in combination were a quarter of the ACA's magnitude. In terms of its impact on average marginal tax rates, the ACA hike is almost double the effect of permanently increasing unemployment benefit payments to 99
weeks from a baseline of 26 weeks (Mulligan 2012 ).
Cutler (2011) argues that the ACA will increase employment because it will cut (or slow the growth of) employer health costs without commensurate reductions in the amount employees value their health benefits. He draws on the work of Baicker and
Chandra (2006), who treat a specific type of health sector waste as a tax effect, thereby suggesting that cutting health sector waste could be included in my Table 1 that itemizes the ACA's incentive-related provisions. I am not sure about Cutler's approach, because unlike the tax effects in Table 1 , reducing health sector waste is not a pure redistribution:
health sector wastes are real resources that have an adverse wealth effect on labor supply.
More important, Cutler's cost effect is trivial on the scale of Table 1 , and could be in either direction.
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The ACA has not been introduced into a tax-free economy, so its marginal tax rate hikes add to marginal tax rates already in effect. I estimate that, by 2015, the average marginal after-tax share among household heads and spouses with near-median weekly earnings will have fallen to 0.50 from 0.60 in 2007, largely from the ACA but also from other expansions in safety net programs. That is a massive 17 percent reduction in the 31 As shown in Figure 2 , the ACA hike comes a year or two after the hike associated with the expiration of the payroll tax cut. 32 Other economists believe that the ACA will increase employer health costs without a commensurate increase in the value of health benefits to employees by, for example, requiring employers to include medical benefits that they would have excluded without the ACA (Cannon 2009 ) (Kessler 2013) . Mulligan (2013b) shows how even Cutler's estimate (the ACA reduces health premiums by 5 percent as of 2015) and approach imply that the cost channel is something like a 0.3-0.6 percentage point reduction in marginal labor income tax rates: health waste amounting to 5 percent of health expenses is 0.3-0.6 percent of the total reward to employment.
reward to working -akin to erasing a decade of labor productivity growth without the wealth effect -that would be expected to significantly depress the amounts of labor and consumer spending in the economy even if the wage elasticity of labor supply were small (but not literally zero). The large tax rate increases shown in Figure 2 are the primary reason why it is unlikely that labor market activity will return even near to its prerecession levels as long as the ACA's work disincentives remain in place.
The labor market has much experience with (implicit and explicit) taxes on earnings and employment. A novel part of the ACA is that it taxes weekly work hours directly: that is, the new law requires employers to report the amount of time that employees work, and bases taxes and subsidies on that report. This new type of taxation should create new types of avoidance behaviors, and may also change society's willingness to use earnings and employment taxes.
By significantly taxing weekly work hours, it might seem that the ACA would encourage employers to hire in order to compensate for the shorter workweek of the average employee (Congressional Budget Office 2011, 8-9) . However, Table 1 shows that the ACA encourages unemployment and labor force exits about as much as it encourages reduced hours, so it would be surprising if the indirect effect on employment through weekly hours would dominate the direct effects of ACA employment taxes. Table 1 does suggest that the reduction in aggregate hours to be created by the ACA will be more intensive in weekly hours and less unemployment intensive than was the recession of 2008-9 because the marginal tax rate hikes during the recession were primarily taxing weeks worked per year rather than hours worked per week (Mulligan 2012 ).
This paper assumes that the employer penalty will not be further delayed, or eliminated. As shown by the difference between marginal tax rates for 2014 and 2015, the magnitude of the ACA's impact on marginal tax rates would be significantly less, but far from zero, in any year without employer penalties. Appendix V contains sensitivity analysis with respect to various other policy parameters and population estimates,
showing that another important assumption is that families will (gross of out-of-pocket costs) value the benefits from a family health plan obtained on the exchanges at about $19,000 per year. The valuation assumption is also related to my assumption that two-26 thirds of persons leaving ESI jobs and eligible for exchange subsidies will actually purchase health plans from the exchanges. Altering the valuation assumptions puts the ACA's addition to the 2016 marginal tax rate in a range of 4.3 to 6.4 percentage points.
The Obama Administration and other advocates of the ACA have dismissed concerns that the law might be trading off labor market activity for more redistribution, citing the absence of a Massachusetts-specific labor market contraction when that state passed its law mandating health insurance coverage. 33 As Jonathan Gruber (2011, 27:02) put it, "we've actually run this experiment, folks: we ran it in Massachusetts." However, this argument assumes that the Massachusetts reform increased marginal tax rates in
Massachusetts by roughly the same magnitude that the ACA will increase them in the United States. This assumption is no longer necessary, because the methodology used in this paper can be applied to Massachusetts as well. Massachusetts marginal tax rates were elevated by its health reform. However, the average increase in Massachusetts was only 0.4 percentage points, as compared to the ACA's 4.9 percentage point impact on nationwide marginal tax rates. The obvious conclusion from these data is to expect the ACA to depress labor markets by at least an order of magnitude more than the Massachusetts reform did. Table 5 reproduces Table 1 using the law's parameters for calendar year 2014. Table 6 shows the results for calendar year 2016.
Appendix I: ACA Marginal Tax Rate Components for 2014 and 2016
33 Cutler (2013) . See also the Department of Health and Human Services statement that "The experience in Massachusetts … suggest [s] that the health care law will improve the affordability and accessibility of health care without significantly affecting the labor market." (Contorno 2013) 
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Appendix II: Details about the Sliding Scale Exchange Subsidies Table 7 displays the sliding scale parameters. Each row is a household income interval relative to the federal poverty line beginning at the income amount indicated in the first column. The second column shows the premium charge for a family with income at the bottom end of the interval, expressed as a percentage of household income. 34 The premium percentage increases smoothly within the interval and as it crosses the next income threshold, with the exceptions (noted in the last column) of: (a) the 1 -1.33 interval where the percentage is constant at 2 percent and jumps discretely to 3 percent and (b) the 4+ interval where there is no premium cap (the premium jumps from 9.5 percent of income to the full premium).
Plan participants pay their designated premium and then receive benefits that are expected to be less than (typically 70 percent of) total medical expenses, with the remainder charged to plan participants as various out-of-pocket costs such as co- Over the income range 1-4 FPL, Table 7 alone has all of the parameters needed to graph household income versus premium (both expressed as a ratio to FPL). The slope of this graph is the rate at which the premium subsidy is phased out with household income, and is less than 100 percent except at the jumps at 1.33 and 4 FPL. Note that Table 1 does not indicate the absolute amount of the premium subsidy, because the absolute amount is the difference between the full cost of the second cheapest silver plan and the 28 premium cap and the plan full cost will vary by year, family size and composition, and state and is not yet known at the time of writing this paper.
Solely for the purpose of preparing Figure 1 , I calculated a dollar range of participant cost-sharing by assuming that plans' EMPs (full premium plus full out-ofpocket costs) ranges from $7,000 to $19,000 per year and using the discount percentages noted in Table 7 . 35 In order to get a FPL range for the cost-sharing amount, I assumed that the $7,000 EMP applied to a family of one and the $19,000 EMP applied to a family of three. 36 These participant cost-sharing amounts (one for each end of the $9,000 -$19,000 EMP range) are added to the premiums implied by Table 7 and shown in Figure   1 in the main text of the paper.
Appendix III: Health Insurance Values
The Congressional Budget Office (2010) By definition, bronze plan premiums cover 60% of expected medical expenses, which would be $20,417 ($7,917).
For my purposes, I need to know how people value the insurance they get, rather than the actuarial cost. These two are related because people demand insurance from their employers, and ultimately receive less cash by the amount of the actuarial value: in effect employees are spending their own cash on the ESI. However, it is conceivable that cost of administration, bureaucracy, and other loadings mean that exchange plans will need to have greater expenses in order to deliver the same benefits as ESI. In this case, the actuarial value of ESI may be a better measure of the value of exchange plans to their participants. 35 The quantitative results in the rest of the paper do not depend on the numerical results presented in Figure 1 . 36 For the purposes of putting an upper bound on participant cost sharing, my assumption does not rule out the possibility that families of four or more would have an EMP of $20,000, because their EMP is less in FPL units than a family of three with a $20,000 EMP because the dollar amount of the FPL increases with family size.
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The Kaiser Foundation's survey of employer plans for 2012 found that average annual premiums were $15,745 ($5,615) for family (single) coverage, respectively (Claxton, et al. 2012 , Exhibit 1.1). Employer plans tend to have premiums equal to about 83% of participant costs, with the other 17% covered by various forms of out-of-pocket payments (Gabel, et al. 2012 20,518 ($7,317) by 2014, respectively, and $22,192 ($7,914 ) by 2016.
Based on these various estimates, my benchmark calculations use a conservative $19,000 ($7,000) expected medical payments for family (single) coverage, respectively, in 2014. Employee plus one coverage value is taken as the average of the two.
As a sensitivity analysis, I assigned an expected medical payment value to each household member on the basis of his or her age and household composition, based on the Kaiser Foundation's silver plan premium calculator (hereafter, "KFF calculator") for calendar year 2014, and then summed across household members. I convert silver plan premiums to expected medical payments (EMP) by dividing by 0.7. Each non-elderly household head or spouse in the CPS is assigned the EMP associated with his or her age.
For the purpose of calculating the household sum associated with a married head or spouse, the other spouse is assumed to be of the same age. Per the KFF calculator, children under 18 are each assigned an EMP of $2,737 (2014 dollars), except that the total EMP for a household's children under 18 is capped at $8,211. Adults other than the head or spouse, as well as heads or spouses less than age 21, are assigned the EMP for a 21-year-old, regardless of their actual age. As shown in Appendix V, the KFF calculator delivers a slightly larger marginal tax rate. In order to estimate a take-up rate for the COBRA subsidy, I first look at the propensity of non-elderly unemployed household heads and spouses to receive COBRA without a subsidy, as opposed to purchasing non-group coverage or going uninsured. The 52 percent participation rate without subsidies is significant for the purpose of understanding the ACA because it indicates that a large fraction of household heads and spouses are willing to pay full price for their health insurance, and presumably even more would be willing to pay less than full price. If people perceive that they can access essentially the same medical services through ACA exchange plans as they access through employer plans, this result suggests that more than half of premium-assistanceeligible household heads and spouses losing ESI coverage through unemployment will participate in the exchanges and receive their subsidy.
In order to obtain a somewhat more precise estimate of COBRA subsidy take-up The COBRA subsidy was not available to unemployed persons unless they were laid off (as opposed to quit or fired for cause). I take this eligibility criterion to be equivalent to receiving unemployment benefits sometime during the unemployment spell, which Mulligan (2012) Because the observations above are consistent with a fairly wide range of exchange subsidy take-up rates, my forecast range must also be wide. My benchmark parameterization assumes a 2/3 take-up rate. A 50 percent take-up rate seems low, but not unreasonable, so I have also estimated marginal tax rates assuming 50 percent take-up and display the results in Appendix V. I doubt that take-up rates will be close to 100 percent, but Appendix V also examines the 100 percent case in order to put an upper bound on the results that could derive from take-up. (4)- (6)- (7)]*0.0765/1.0765
Appendix V: Sensitivity Analysis
Health insurance premiums employer 11,154 0 (6) = 78% of total premium (ESI only) employee, excluded from tax base 3,146 0 (7) = 22% of total premium (ESI only) employee, included in tax base 0 1,304 (8) = 3.7% of (12) ACA 0 10,806 (9) = 70% of total health expenses - (8) out-of-pocket health expenses employee 3,000 1,038 (10) = 17% (6%) of total ESI (exch.) expenses ACA 0 4,152 Notes: Both types of employees work 50 weeks per year. The ACA exchange plan is assumed to be a silver plan (70% actuarial value). 
